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file-access-preflight

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Run the pre-flight checklist before an agent gets filesystem access — the scope boundary (which directories, read vs write), the secrets-exposure sweep, the destructive-operation gates, and the path-traversal and untrusted-file defenses. Use when asked let my agent access my files safely, is it safe to give the agent file/computer access, guardrails before the agent touches my filesystem, or scope down my coding agent's reach. Produces the scope boundary, the secrets sweep, the write/delete gates, and the untrusted-content rules.

plugins/pm-seatbelt/skills/file-access-preflight/SKILL.md

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# File Access Preflight Skill

Filesystem access is where an agent goes from talking to *doing* — and the two failure modes are opposite: reading too much (the agent slurps your `.env`, SSH keys, and password manager export into its context and thence into logs and API calls) and writing too much (a confused or hijacked agent overwrites, deletes, or `rm -rf`s outside its lane). The seatbelt: draw the scope boundary tightly, sweep for the secrets that must never enter context, gate the destructive operations, and treat file *contents* as untrusted input — because a file the agent reads can carry instructions just like an email or a web page.

## What This Skill Produces

- **The scope boundary** — the exact directories the agent may read and (separately, more narrowly) write, and everything explicitly out of bounds
- **The secrets sweep** — the credential-bearing files that must be excluded from the agent's reachable scope, checked before go-live
- **The destructive-operation gates** — which writes/deletes/moves require confirmation, and the never-outside-scope rule
- **The untrusted-content defenses** — the rule that file contents are data, and the path-traversal guard

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