Individual skill
audit-redirects
Find open redirects in pracht loaders, middleware, and navigation, including hand-rolled 3xx responses that bypass the built-in guards. Use for "audit redirects", "check for open redirects", "is my ?redirect= param safe", "review login redirects".
skills/audit-redirects/SKILL.md
Source commit e7c088a615e0bc16659d7a307fe92910ae6bd546
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- Last checked
- Nov 11, 2026
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- Repository last updated
- Nov 10, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- agent-skills Repository topic
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# Pracht Audit Redirects
The classic open-redirect bug: `/login?redirect=https://evil.example` →
after login, the app redirects the user to attacker territory carrying a fresh
session.
What the framework guarantees: the client router drops non-`http(s):` schemes
at the navigation boundary, and server-side `redirect()` /
`buildRedirectResponse()` reject non-`http(s):` schemes and CR/LF injection
against the `Location` header. What it cannot decide is whether the target
*origin or path* is one you trust — and a raw
`new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: userInput } })`
bypasses all of those guards entirely.