Individual skill
guidewire-security-and-rbac
Lock down a Guidewire Cloud API integration so it survives a SOC 2 audit, an NAIC Model Audit Rule review, and a real-world incident — least-privilege role design, encrypted committed secrets via SOPS+age, PII redaction in logs (SSN/DOB/claim narrative), audit-trail capture, cross-tenant isolation for multi-carrier integrations, and detect-and-rotate response to token leaks. Use when designing the security posture for a new integration, hardening an existing one before audit, or responding to a leaked credential. Trigger with "guidewire security", "guidewire rbac", "guidewire pii redaction", "guidewire audit trail", "guidewire secret leak".
skills/.curated/guidewire-security-and-rbac/SKILL.md
Source commit 0500b275e963c027f6b410e8c49c0446945c574e
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- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 12, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 2,916
- Repository last updated
- Nov 12, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- ai Repository topic
- automation Repository topic
- claude-code Repository topic
- devops Repository topic
- mcp Repository topic
- ai-agents Repository topic
- anthropic Repository topic
- claude-code-plugins Repository topic
- developer-tools Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- guidewire Declared skill tag
- security Declared skill tag
- rbac Declared skill tag
- pii Declared skill tag
- sops Declared skill tag
- audit Declared skill tag
- security Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 14,037 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 14,037 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 14,037 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 14,037 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 14,037 bytesreferences/API_REFERENCE.mddoc · 5,859 bytesreferences/implementation-guide.mddoc · 4,823 bytes
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# Guidewire Security and RBAC
## Overview
Build the security posture an integration needs in production: secrets that cannot leak from the repo, roles that cannot escalate beyond their job, logs that cannot exfiltrate PII, and an audit trail that satisfies SOC 2 and NAIC Model Audit Rule reviewers. This skill is the application of generic security practice to the specific shape of Guidewire Cloud API — claim and policy data carry regulated PII; a leaked client_secret can read or write a carrier's entire book of business; carriers operate under state-level insurance regulator scrutiny.
Five real-world failures this skill prevents:
1. **Plaintext `.env` in the repo** — a `git push` to a public mirror leaks live credentials; the only defense is to never have plaintext in the tree, full stop.
2. **Over-scoped Service Application** — every integration starts with `pc.account.write` "to make development easier" and is never narrowed; the audit finding cites OWASP A01 broken access control.
3. **PII in observability** — `console.log(claim)` dumps SSN, DOB, claim narrative, and phone numbers into the logging pipeline, where they replicate to every downstream tool the company uses.
4. **No audit trail of what the integration did** — security review asks "what did this service touch in the last 90 days" and the answer is "everything in the access log, but we cannot tell which actor"; the audit fails.
5. **Cross-tenant data bleed** — a multi-tenant integration uses one set of credentials per environment instead of per tenant; a bug in tenant routing leaks Carrier A's data into Carrier B's response.