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hunt-k8s

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Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626), API-server-mediated nodes/proxy RCE, EphemeralContainers node-shell, bound/projected SA-token audience+expiry abuse, admission-controller bypass, Helm/Tiller remnants. Use when target runs containerized infra, exposes K8s ports (6443/10250/10255/2379/8443), or cloud metadata reveals K8s service accounts.

skills/hunt-k8s/SKILL.md

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Nov 10, 2026
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# HUNT-K8S — Kubernetes & Docker Security

## Crown Jewel Targets

K8s API anonymous cluster-admin = full cluster control. docker.sock + RCE = host root. A single privileged-pod create or a kubelet `/run` shell pivots one finding to total compromise.

**Highest-value findings:**
- **K8s API anonymous cluster-admin** — `system:anonymous`/`system:unauthenticated` bound to a powerful role (classic misconfig: `system:anonymous` in a `ClusterRoleBinding` to `cluster-admin`) → full `kubectl`. Mere anonymous `200` is NOT this (see false-positive section).
- **Kubelet `10250` exec/run** — `/run` returns command output directly; `/exec` is a SPDY/WebSocket stream (see Phase 3). Either → RCE in any pod → steal that pod's SA token.
- **API-server-mediated kubelet RCE** — `/api/v1/nodes/<node>/proxy/run/...` reaches the kubelet *through* the API server using your (low-priv) token; if RBAC grants `nodes/proxy`, you get pod RCE without touching 10250 directly. Primary 2024-2026 vector.
- **etcd `2379` unauth** — every Secret (SA tokens, TLS keys, app creds) stored, often plaintext (unless `EncryptionConfiguration` is set) → full credential dump.
- **docker.sock exposure** — SSRF/LFI/RCE reaching `/var/run/docker.sock` → create `--privileged` container, bind-mount host `/` → host root.
- **Container escape via runc** — Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626): `WORKDIR`/`process.cwd` pointing at a leaked `/proc/self/fd/<n>` host FD → break out of an attacker-controlled image/exec to host root.
- **SA token abuse** — auto-mounted token at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`; check its real grants with SelfSubjectRulesReview before claiming impact.
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