Individual skill
supply-chain-attack-recon
External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.
skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md
Source commit d67cc00d9297a15b9210121e0a93c33f9fb6be46
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 9, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 5,503
- Repository last updated
- Nov 8, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- ai-security Repository topic
- anthropic Repository topic
- application-security Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- bugbounty Repository topic
- bugcrowd Repository topic
- claude Repository topic
- claude-code Repository topic
- claude-skills Repository topic
- ethical-hacking Repository topic
- devops Derived category
- engineering Derived category
- devops-containers Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Browse files
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Read excerpt
## When to use
Trigger when:
- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)
- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (`@target-internal/...`, `target-utils`, `target-shared`)
- Build logs, SBOMs, or `package-lock.json` files are publicly accessible
- Target uses CI/CD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)
- Docker images on Docker Hub/GHCR/Quay belong to target org
- Findings include `npmrc`/`pip.conf`/`gradle.properties` with internal registry URLs
- `.github/workflows/*.yml` files reference internal tooling
Do NOT use for:
- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)
- Actually publishing typosquats / dep-confusion packages without explicit OK