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geb-literature-positioning

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Use when positioning a game-theory manuscript against the existing literature for Games and Economic Behavior (GEB) — staking what is new relative to known solution concepts, theorems, mechanisms, and prior experiments. Sharpens the contribution; it is not a standalone survey.

Games-and-Economic-Behavior-Skills/skills/geb-literature-positioning/SKILL.md

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# Literature Positioning (geb-literature-positioning)

## When to trigger

- The relation to prior game-theory results is vague ("related to a large literature")
- You cannot name the two or three papers you most directly generalize or beat
- A reviewer might say "this is already known" or "this is just a special case of X"
- The paper reads as a survey with a result attached, instead of a result with placement

## The GEB positioning bar

GEB is a **specialist** journal, so its referees and Advisory Editors are game-theory experts who know the canonical results cold. Positioning here is sharper than at a general-economics journal: you are not explaining game theory to outsiders, you are convincing insiders that your theorem, mechanism, or experiment is **not implied by what they already know**. Because the chief editor routes your paper to an **anonymous Advisory Editor** (one of ~45) who selects referees, the people judging novelty are likely to include authors of the nearest prior work — position honestly and precisely.

GEB also spans **economics, political science, biology, computer science, mathematics, and psychology**, so the "nearest neighbor" to your result may live in a CS/EC or biology literature, not only in economics. Search across those fields; a result already known in algorithmic game theory or evolutionary biology is not novel just because it is new to economics.
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