Individual skill
system-prompt-leakage
Hunt LLM system-prompt leakage (OWASP LLM07:2025) — exfiltration of the privileged system prompt revealing internal rules, secrets baked in, tool inventory, and business logic that should not be client-visible.
packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/analyst/system-prompt-leakage/SKILL.md
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- Last checked
- Nov 8, 2026
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- Repository last updated
- Nov 7, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
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- agent Repository topic
- ai Repository topic
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- hacking Repository topic
- langchain Repository topic
- langgraph Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- generative-ai Repository topic
- pentesting Repository topic
- pentest Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
- security Derived category
- security-application Derived category
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# LLM System Prompt Leakage (LLM07:2025)
The system prompt is the application's contract with the model. When
it leaks, the attacker learns the tool inventory, the safety rules to
bypass, the customer-tier flags, and (frequently) credentials that an
inexperienced operator pasted directly into the prompt template. This
finding type is the highest-yield reconnaissance step on any LLM
engagement — do it before anything else.
## 1. Recognition signals
- The product has any LLM interface (chatbot, copilot, agent).
- Vendor talks about "guardrails" or "policy" in the system prompt.
- The same product appears to behave differently per user tier — the