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bfla

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Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) — exploit action-level access control failures where lower-privileged principals invoke admin/staff functions across REST, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, and background job paths.

packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/web/bfla/SKILL.md

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Nov 9, 2026

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Nov 9, 2026
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Apache-2.0

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# Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA)

BFLA is an action-level access control failure: a lower-privileged principal successfully invokes a function (HTTP endpoint, GraphQL mutation, gRPC method, WebSocket event, background job action) that should be restricted to a higher-privileged role. It is distinct from IDOR (T1190 object-level) — the surface here is the *action itself*, not the object ID. Enforcement must bind actor to action at every transport layer and every service boundary, not just at the UI or API gateway.

**Authorized use only.** Only test systems you are explicitly authorized to assess. Privilege escalation in production without authorization is a crime in most jurisdictions.

## Attack Surface

- REST/JSON admin endpoints hidden from the UI but still live on the server
- GraphQL mutations and admin fields absent from the published schema but introspectable
- gRPC methods listed via server reflection that bypass gateway checks
- WebSocket events where only the handshake was authorized
- Background job create/finalize/approve endpoints that re-use session but skip role checks
- Internal microservice RPCs reachable via SSRF or exposed routing
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