Individual skill
poisoned-pipeline-execution
Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) — direct + indirect: inject commands via attacker-controllable build files (Makefile, package.json scripts, build.gradle, Dangerfile, .pre-commit-config.yaml), abuse pull_request_target / fork-PR triggers, and ride dependency / test-script execution on CI.
packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/poisoned-pipeline-execution/SKILL.md
Source commit df879550544d36b6b1e69062f05adae28537adf2
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 8, 2026
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 6,568
- Repository last updated
- Nov 7, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent Repository topic
- ai Repository topic
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- hacking Repository topic
- langchain Repository topic
- langgraph Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- generative-ai Repository topic
- pentesting Repository topic
- pentest Repository topic
- ci-cd,-ppe,-pipeline,-execution Declared skill tag
- testing Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Read excerpt
# Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE)
PPE = run attacker code inside the target's CI job by editing files the pipeline already executes. Two flavors (Palawan / CIDER taxonomy):
- **Direct PPE (D-PPE)**: attacker edits the *pipeline config itself* (`.github/workflows/*.yml`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, `Jenkinsfile`) in a PR/branch the CI runs.
- **Indirect PPE (I-PPE)**: attacker edits a file the *pipeline calls* — build scripts (`Makefile`, `build.gradle`, `pom.xml`), package-manager scripts (`package.json` `scripts`, `setup.py`), lint/test hooks (`Dangerfile`, `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, `tox.ini`, `pyproject.toml` `[tool.poetry.scripts]`), or any file `make test` ends up sourcing.
## Recon — does the target build untrusted code?
```bash
# 1. Workflow triggers that build PRs
grep -rE '^\s*(pull_request|pull_request_target)\s*:' <REPO>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null
# 2. Does CI install + run scripts before any review gate?