Individual skill
hunt-nodejs
Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via /proc/self/environ. Use when target runs Node.js/Express/Fastify/NestJS/Koa.
knowledge/Claude-BugHunter/skills/hunt-nodejs/SKILL.md
Source commit 961a0dd3d2d2f66a07a416ade3b1d4473b64802e
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- Last checked
- Nov 4, 2026
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- Nov 5, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
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# HUNT-NODEJS — Node.js Specific Vulnerabilities
## Crown Jewel Targets
Prototype Pollution reaching a sink in Node.js backend = Critical RCE.
**Highest-value chains:**
- **Prototype Pollution → RCE** — `__proto__` injection via `lodash.merge` / `Object.assign` → polluted prototype reaches `child_process.exec` or `vm.runInNewContext` sink
- **Express trust proxy** — `app.set('trust proxy', true)` without validation → attacker sets `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits
- **EJS/Pug SSTI** — template engine receives user input → `{{= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') }}`
- **`child_process` injection** — user input interpolated into shell command string → OS command injection
- **`require()` path traversal** — attacker-controlled module path → load arbitrary file as JS
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