Individual skill

performing-log-analysis-for-forensic-investigation

Collect, parse, and correlate system, application, and security logs to reconstruct events and establish timelines during forensic investigations.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/performing-log-analysis-for-forensic-investigation/SKILL.md

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# Performing Log Analysis for Forensic Investigation

## When to Use
- When reconstructing the timeline of a security incident from available log sources
- During post-breach investigation to identify initial access, lateral movement, and exfiltration
- When correlating events across multiple systems and log sources
- For establishing evidence of unauthorized access or policy violations
- When preparing forensic reports requiring detailed event chronology

## Detection Gaps & Validation

The events you never see are usually the important ones. Account for these before concluding a timeline is complete:

- **Cleared/disabled logging looks like an alibi.** Windows Event ID 1102 (Security log cleared) and 104 (System log cleared) mark tampering; a sudden stop in 4624/4688 events often means auditing was turned off (4719) or the channel was cleared, not that the host was idle. On Linux, watch for truncated auth.log/journald gaps. Always note the earliest and latest event per channel and flag unexplained gaps.