Individual skill

hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows

Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows/SKILL.md

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# Hunting for Persistence Mechanisms in Windows

## When to Use

- During periodic proactive threat hunts for dormant backdoors
- After an incident to identify all persistence mechanisms an attacker planted
- When investigating unusual services, scheduled tasks, or startup entries
- When threat intel reports describe new persistence techniques in the wild
- During security posture assessments to identify unauthorized persistent software

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Run-key-centric hunts miss the stealthy spots.** WMI event subscriptions (Sysmon EID 19/20/21), COM hijacks (`HKCU\...\CLSID\{..}\InprocServer32`), IFEO/GlobalFlag debuggers, and services created by direct registry edits (which generate no 4697) all evade Run-key/startup-folder sweeps.
- **Signed-but-malicious passes signature checks:** DLL sideloading into a legitimately signed application looks clean to "Signed=Yes" filters.