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serverless-cloud-security

Serverless offensive testing across AWS Lambda and Function URLs, Azure Functions with Managed Identity, and GCP Cloud Functions and Cloud Run — public invocation, weak authorization, event injection, unsafe deserialization, SSRF to metadata, secrets in environment variables and packages, overprivileged execution identities, and deployment artifact poisoning

internal/tools/skills/data/cloud-security/serverless-cloud-security/SKILL.md

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# Serverless Cloud Security

## Purpose
Offensive testing of serverless workloads: externally reachable functions (black-box) and credentialed function review (roles, environment, packages, event wiring). Consolidates the former serverless review/hardening guidance into attack-driven methodology.

## Entry Conditions
- Black-box: function URLs, API Gateway stages, or app endpoints invoking serverless backends (from `cloud-attack-surface-discovery`)
- Credentialed: cloud context from the provider pentest skill; function inventory visible

## Discovery Signals
- `*.lambda-url.*.on.aws`, API Gateway `execute-api` hosts, Azure Functions endpoints (`*.azurewebsites.net/api/*`), `*.cloudfunctions.net`, `*.run.app`
- API responses shaped like function output (missing static-asset semantics, `x-amz-*` invocation headers, `RequestId` fields)
- Event-driven features in the product (uploads → S3 triggers, form submissions → queues → functions)