Individual skill

testing-for-email-header-injection

Test web application email functionality for SMTP header injection vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject additional email headers, modify recipients, and abuse contact forms for spam relay.

internal/tools/skills/data/web-application-security/testing-for-email-header-injection/SKILL.md

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# Testing for Email Header Injection

## When to Use
- When testing contact forms, feedback forms, or "email a friend" functionality
- During assessment of password reset email functionality
- When testing newsletter subscription or notification email systems
- During penetration testing of applications that send emails based on user input
- When auditing email-related API endpoints for header injection

### How to CONFIRM a Hit (avoid false negatives)

- **Positive signal**: an injected CRLF actually adds a header or recipient that takes effect — a copy of the email lands in your attacker-controlled (e.g. agentmail) inbox via injected `Cc`/`Bcc`, or `From`/`Reply-To` is overridden in the delivered message.
- Confirm by inspecting the **raw source / "Show Original"** of a RECEIVED email for your injected `Cc:`, `Bcc:`, `From:`, `Reply-To:`, or overridden body — do not rely on the form returning success.
- An HTTP 200 from the form is NOT a hit (the app may strip newlines); a single failed payload is NOT a clean negative until encodings and fields are varied.