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hunting-for-dcsync-attacks

Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/hunting-for-dcsync-attacks/SKILL.md

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# Hunting for DCSync Attacks

## When to Use

- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)
- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment
- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise
- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests
- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **No SACL = no telemetry.** Event 4662 is only generated if "Audit Directory Service Access" is enabled AND the domain object's SACL audits the replication extended rights. Without both, DCSync is completely invisible — verify the SACL before trusting a "clean" result.
- **Both GUIDs matter:** flag `DS-Replication-Get-Changes` (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) AND `DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All` (1131f6ad-...). Get-Changes-All is the strong signal; Get-Changes alone can be benign.