Individual skill

hunting-for-webshell-activity

Hunt for web shell deployments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/hunting-for-webshell-activity/SKILL.md

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# Hunting For Webshell Activity

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for webshell activity in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **File-create hunting misses a lot:** shells appended to existing legit `.aspx`/`.php`, stored in a database, loaded as an in-memory IIS module (T1505.004), or served via handler mapping under a benign extension. Hash/signature scans miss obfuscated one-liners like `<?php @eval($_POST['x']);?>`.
- **Process lineage is the durable signal:** w3wp.exe / httpd / tomcat / php-cgi spawning cmd.exe/powershell/whoami (EID 1, ParentImage = web server) catches even unknown shells; EID 11 FileCreate in webroot by the web-server process (not a deploy pipeline) is high-signal.