Individual skill

analyzing-docker-container-forensics

Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence.

internal/tools/skills/data/digital-forensics/analyzing-docker-container-forensics/SKILL.md

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# Analyzing Docker Container Forensics

## When to Use
- When investigating a compromised Docker container or container host
- For analyzing malicious Docker images pulled from registries
- During incident response involving containerized application breaches
- When examining container escape attempts or privilege escalation
- For auditing container configurations and identifying misconfigurations

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **Ephemeral evidence is lost first:** `docker stop`/`rm` destroys the writable layer and in-memory state. Before anything else, `docker pause` then `docker export`/`docker commit` the running container and dump host process memory (`/proc/<pid>/`), because a removed container's overlay2 `diff` dir under `/var/lib/docker/overlay2/<id>/diff` may already be reaped.
- **Most-missed artifacts:** the json-file logs at `/var/lib/docker/containers/<id>/<id>-json.log`, `config.v2.json`/`hostconfig.json` (mounts, caps, env secrets), and the image `history` (`RUN` lines that added a backdoor). `docker logs` returns nothing if the container used a `syslog`/`none`/`journald` logging driver - pivot to host journald.
- **Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis:** `docker diff` only reflects the writable layer, so files baked into a malicious image layer (or written to a `tmpfs`/anonymous volume) never appear as "changed." Compare layers with `container-diff`/`dive` against the pulled base image and inspect each `layer.tar` directly.