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detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

internal/tools/skills/data/threat-hunting/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md

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# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory

## When to Use

- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening

## Detection Gaps & Validation

- **No SACL = no 4662.** The detection depends entirely on an audit SACL on the domain object covering "Replicating Directory Changes." Without it the DCSync generates zero 4662 events. Verify the SACL on the domain root and that `auditpol /get /subcategory:"Directory Service Access"` shows Success.
- **Properties field gets dropped.** Many log pipelines truncate or omit the 4662 `Properties` field that carries the replication GUIDs (`1131f6aa-…`, `1131f6ad-…`). Confirm your parser preserves it or the query matches nothing.