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hunt-websocket

Hunt WebSocket vulnerabilities — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH), missing/weak Origin validation on the WS handshake, no per-message authentication, message tampering, socket.io namespace/room authorization bypass, and handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling. Use when target has WebSocket endpoints (ws:// or wss://), socket.io / SignalR / Phoenix Channels, real-time features, chat, live dashboards, notifications, or trading platforms.

redteam/hunt-websocket/SKILL.md

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Yes
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Observed behavior
Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 3, 2026

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1,328
Repository last updated
Nov 7, 2026
License
MIT

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# HUNT-WEBSOCKET — WebSocket Security

## Crown Jewel Targets

[Credential-related source omitted]

**Highest-value chains:**
- **CSWSH → data exfil / ATO** — handshake authenticates via ambient cookie, no CSRF token, Origin not enforced → attacker page opens WS as the victim and streams their messages/PII/tokens. If the stream carries a session/refresh/CSRF token, this escalates to ATO.
- **No per-message auth** — HTTP/handshake auth present but individual WS frames are not re-authorized → privileged messages accepted (`deleteUser`, `getSecretConfig`).
- **Message tampering** — modify in-flight frames (price, qty, userId, amount) in trading/game/checkout apps → financial fraud.
- **socket.io namespace / room authz bypass** — connect to a privileged namespace or join another user's room without a permission check → cross-tenant real-time exfil.
- **Handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling** — a malformed `Upgrade`/`Connection`/`Sec-WebSocket-*` handshake makes the front proxy and origin disagree on whether an upgrade occurred → request-smuggling tunnel.

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