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offensive-wpa3-sae

WPA3 / SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) attack methodology — transition-mode (mixed WPA2/WPA3) downgrade, Dragonblood side-channel attacks (CVE-2019-9494, 9495, 13377, 13456), SAE auth flooding for AP CPU exhaustion, Hash-to-Element (H2E) timing analysis, group downgrade, and 6 GHz / Wi-Fi 6E spec implications (PMF mandatory, no transition mode allowed). Use when target advertises WPA3-SAE or WPA3-Personal/Enterprise, or operates in 6 GHz where WPA3 + PMF are required by spec.

Skills/wireless/offensive-wpa3-sae/SKILL.md

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# WPA3 / SAE Attacks

WPA3 fixes the offline-handshake-cracking weakness of WPA2 by replacing the 4-way PSK exchange with SAE (a Dragonfly-derived password-authenticated key exchange). The straightforward offline crack disappears — but transition-mode misconfigurations and the original SAE implementation's side-channel leaks open new paths.

## Quick Workflow

1. Verify the target advertises WPA3 (RSN IE shows AKM SAE = 8)
2. Check for transition-mode (mixed WPA2 + WPA3) — easiest path
3. If pure WPA3, fingerprint the AP's hostapd version for Dragonblood applicability
4. Side-channel timing or cache attacks if reachable
5. Otherwise, accept that offline cracking isn't viable — pivot to other surfaces

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