Individual skill
cicd-security
Harden GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, and similar pipelines against supply-chain attacks, secret exfiltration, and pwn-request abuse. Use when authoring or reviewing workflow files, adding a third-party action, image, or script, wiring cloud or registry credentials into CI, or triaging a suspected pipeline compromise.
skills/cicd-security/SKILL.md
Source commit eaba88102d91df65a9aa6397e8507c315c018f5e
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- No
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Not checked yet
- Last checked
- Nov 6, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
Install this skill
Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.
Standard SKILL.md format has not been attested at this commit. No installation command is available; inspect the source.
Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 23
- Repository last updated
- Aug 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- claude-skills Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- security Repository topic
- skills Repository topic
- operations Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Browse files
SKILL.mdcore · 8,698 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 8,698 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 8,698 byteschecklists/gitlab_ci_hardening.yamlasset · 3,391 bytesreferences/verifying-findings.mddoc · 3,879 bytestests/corpus.jsonasset · 2,265 bytes
Read excerpt
# CI/CD Pipeline Security
## Rules (for AI agents)
### ALWAYS
- Pin every third-party GitHub Action by **commit SHA** (full 40-char), never by
a floating tag (`@v1`, `@main`, `@latest`) — tags can be re-pushed. The
tj-actions/changed-files March 2025 incident exfiltrated secrets from 23,000+
repositories specifically because consumers used floating tags. Same applies to
GitLab CI `include:` references and reusable workflows. Renovate / Dependabot
can keep the SHA pins fresh.
<!-- pattern: { id: gha-pin-actions-by-sha, severity: high, check: deterministic } -->
- Declare `permissions:` at the workflow or job level and default to
[Credential-related source omitted]