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cicd-security

Harden GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, and similar pipelines against supply-chain attacks, secret exfiltration, and pwn-request abuse. Use when authoring or reviewing workflow files, adding a third-party action, image, or script, wiring cloud or registry credentials into CI, or triaging a suspected pipeline compromise.

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<!-- Native skill bundle for Claude Code. Generated by `secure-vibe dev regenerate`. -->
<!-- Do not edit by hand; the source of truth is skills/cicd-security/SKILL.md. -->

# CI/CD Pipeline Security

Harden GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, and similar pipelines against supply-chain attacks, secret exfiltration, and pwn-request abuse. Use when authoring or reviewing workflow files, adding a third-party action, image, or script, wiring cloud or registry credentials into CI, or triaging a suspected pipeline compromise.

## ALWAYS

- Pin every third-party GitHub Action by **commit SHA** (full 40-char), never by a floating tag (`@v1`, `@main`, `@latest`) — tags can be re-pushed. The tj-actions/changed-files March 2025 incident exfiltrated secrets from 23,000+ repositories specifically because consumers used floating tags. Same applies to GitLab CI `include:` references and reusable workflows. Renovate / Dependabot can keep the SHA pins fresh.
[Credential-related source omitted]
[Credential-related source omitted]
- Treat `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, and any `pull_request` job that uses `actions/checkout` with `ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}` as **trusted-context-on-untrusted-code** — the "pwn request" pattern documented by GitHub Security Lab. Either don't run them, or run with no secrets and no write tokens. A fork's GitLab merge-request pipeline is the same shape — it runs the fork's own `.gitlab-ci.yml` on your runners: isolate them, expose no protected variables.
- Echo every untrusted expression (`${{ github.event.* }}`) through an environment variable first; never interpolate it directly into `run:` body — that's the canonical GitHub Actions script-injection sink. The GitLab sink has the same shape: `$CI_*` / `$TRIGGER_*` interpolated into `bash -c` or `eval`, where merge-request metadata carries the shell metacharacters.