Individual skill

saas-security

Wiring your application to a third-party SaaS platform: verifying an inbound webhook against the vendor's own scheme rather than a generalized one, why a valid signature identifies the sender and not the user in the payload, replay windows, one credential per integration and per environment, least-privilege scopes, and treating a bulk export as a data boundary. Use when writing a webhook receiver, an OAuth integration, a SCIM endpoint, or any code that authenticates to or from a SaaS vendor.

skills/saas-security/SKILL.md

Read pinned source

Source commit eaba88102d91df65a9aa6397e8507c315c018f5e

What was checked

Matches the observed repository HEAD
Yes
Scanner rules are current
Yes
Repository scan complete
No
Skill scan complete
Yes
Observed behavior
Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 6, 2026

These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.

Install this skill

Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.

Standard SKILL.md format has not been attested at this commit. No installation command is available; inspect the source.

Repository context

Repository stars (not skill ratings)
23
Repository last updated
Aug 14, 2026
License
MIT

Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.

Files and excerpt

File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.

Browse files
Read excerpt

# SaaS Integration Security

## Rules (for AI agents)

### ALWAYS
- Verify an inbound webhook against **that vendor's documented scheme**, and do not
  generalize from another one. Vendors differ in the header, in the secret, and — the
  part that breaks a generalized implementation — in the **canonical string** that gets
  signed. Some sign the raw body, some sign a version prefix plus a timestamp plus the
  body, some sign the HTTP method and path as well. Read the vendor's page for the
  vendor you are integrating; a signature routine copied from a different vendor
  produces a receiver that rejects every legitimate event, and the fix someone reaches
  for is to turn verification off.
- Verify against the **raw request body**, exactly as received, before any parsing or