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database-security

Prevent SQL and NoSQL injection, unsafe ORM and raw-query use, over-privileged database identities, weak tenant isolation, and unauthenticated database transport. Use when generating SQL or raw query strings, NoSQL filters, ORM models or queries, database migration files, or connection strings.

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<!-- Native skill bundle for Claude Code. Generated by `secure-vibe dev regenerate`. -->
<!-- Do not edit by hand; the source of truth is skills/database-security/SKILL.md. -->

# Database Security

Prevent SQL and NoSQL injection, unsafe ORM and raw-query use, over-privileged database identities, weak tenant isolation, and unauthenticated database transport. Use when generating SQL or raw query strings, NoSQL filters, ORM models or queries, database migration files, or connection strings.

## ALWAYS

- Bind every untrusted data value through the driver or ORM parameter API. Never place it into SQL with language-level interpolation or concatenation — `+`, f-strings, `%` formatting, `.format()`, JavaScript template interpolation. Driver placeholders (`%s`, `?`, `$1`, `:name`, `@name`) are the binding *mechanism*, not string formatting; confusing the two is how this rule is most often misread. The same applies to values read back out of the database and used to build a later query: stored input is still input, and second-order injection is this bug with a delay.
- Prefer the ORM's structured query-expression API over textual SQL. Where raw SQL is genuinely needed, use that framework's documented parameter-binding mechanism and never interpolate untrusted values into it. `references/orm-safe-query-examples.md` carries the verified form per framework.
- For SQL structure that cannot be a bind parameter — table and column identifiers, sort direction, sometimes the operator itself — map the external value to a fixed operator-controlled allowlist. Never copy an untrusted identifier or SQL fragment into the statement, escaped or not.
- Treat a NoSQL query as a structure, not a string. Build filters with the driver's typed query objects, and coerce every request-supplied value to its expected scalar type before it reaches a filter. A JSON body substituting `{"$ne": null}` where a string was expected turns an equality check into a match-all — operator injection needs no quote to break out of.
- Give each application its own database identity with the minimum grants it needs, and separate runtime privileges from migration privileges. The runtime identity must not receive schema-owner or DDL rights merely because migrations require them.