Individual skill
auth-security
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skills/auth-security/SKILL.md
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- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
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- No
- Observed behavior
- Instructions only
- Last checked
- Nov 6, 2026
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- 23
- Repository last updated
- Aug 14, 2026
- License
- MIT
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- claude-skills Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- security Repository topic
- skills Repository topic
- engineering Derived category
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SKILL.mdcore · 8,415 bytesSKILL.mdcore · 8,415 bytesreferences/verifying-findings.mddoc · 4,338 bytesrules/jwt_safe_config.jsonasset · 2,139 bytesrules/oauth_flows.jsonasset · 2,127 bytestests/corpus.jsonasset · 1,787 bytes
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# Authentication & Authorization Security
## Rules (for AI agents)
### ALWAYS
- Authorize at the **object level** — confirm the authenticated subject actually has
access to the requested resource ID, not just that they are logged in. Being signed
in is not permission to read record 4,182 (OWASP API1 — BOLA / IDOR).
- Bind object-level authorization to the **authenticated principal**, never to an
actor id echoed in the request: checking that a request-supplied
`senderId`/`ownerId`/`actedBy` is a valid member validates the *claimed* actor, not
the caller (looks like authorization, isn't).
- On `/{scopeId}/.../{subjectId}` routes, authorize the **relationship** — confirm the
subject belongs to that scope. A caller-vs-scope check alone does not authorize the