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auth-security

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skills/auth-security/SKILL.md

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# Authentication & Authorization Security

## Rules (for AI agents)

### ALWAYS
- Authorize at the **object level** — confirm the authenticated subject actually has
  access to the requested resource ID, not just that they are logged in. Being signed
  in is not permission to read record 4,182 (OWASP API1 — BOLA / IDOR).
- Bind object-level authorization to the **authenticated principal**, never to an
  actor id echoed in the request: checking that a request-supplied
  `senderId`/`ownerId`/`actedBy` is a valid member validates the *claimed* actor, not
  the caller (looks like authorization, isn't).
- On `/{scopeId}/.../{subjectId}` routes, authorize the **relationship** — confirm the
  subject belongs to that scope. A caller-vs-scope check alone does not authorize the