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evo-erlang-ssh-cve-patch

Identifies and patches CVE-2025-32433 in Erlang/OTP SSH server source code by inserting an authentication-state check in ssh_connection.erl that rejects connection protocol messages (IDs >= 80) received before authentication is complete.

tasks-evolved/fix-erlang-ssh-cve/environment/skills/evo-erlang-ssh-cve-patch/SKILL.md

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Sep 10, 2026
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Apache-2.0

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# evo-erlang-ssh-cve-patch

## Overview
CVE-2025-32433 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) pre-authentication Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Erlang/OTP SSH server. The server fails to validate authentication state before processing SSH connection protocol messages (message IDs >= 80), allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands without credentials.

## Vulnerability Details
- **Root Cause**: `ssh_connection.erl`'s `handle_msg/4` function processes channel messages (SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) without checking if `#ssh{authenticated}` is true
- **Attack Vector**: After completing key exchange, attacker sends SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN (ID 90) + SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST (ID 98) with exec type, bypassing authentication entirely
- **Affected Versions**: All Erlang/OTP versions before 27.3.3, 26.2.5.11, 25.3.2.20

## The Fix
Add a pattern-matching clause in `ssh_connection.erl` that catches ANY message when `authenticated = false` on the server side, returning a disconnect error. This clause must be placed BEFORE any channel message handlers but is naturally placed after any disconnect handler.

### Exact Erlang Code to Insert