Individual skill
tool-design-security
Design or audit a tool's trust boundary: keep API keys and tenant ids out of model-visible parameters, resist prompt injection, enforce permissions and approval gates in code, declare scopes, and log calls safely.
plugins/runtypelabs/skills/skills/tool-design-security/SKILL.md
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SKILL.mdcore · 12,908 bytesagents/openai.yamlasset · 310 bytes
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# Tool Security and Context Design
Prompts express intent; code enforces rules. An agent under prompt injection will try
to call the wrong tool with the wrong arguments and will produce a persuasive reason
for doing so. The only defenses that hold are the ones the tool layer enforces without
consulting the model.
## Procedure
1. **Name the principal.** Who is the tool acting as: a user, a service account, an
organization? Where does that identity come from (session, token, context object)?
2. **Route every credential through injection.** No secret, token, or key is ever a
model-visible parameter.
3. **Write the permission check in code**, before the operation, for both the action