Individual skill
http-request-smuggling
Detect HTTP request smuggling by desynchronising front-end and back-end request parsing, using raw-socket timing and differential probes. Use when testing for HTTP desync (CL.TE, TE.CL).
skills/applicative-pentest/http-request-smuggling/SKILL.md
Source commit 0c1bc93fd5124e7a862d61c1b434f32ba8790e3a
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 5, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 153
- Repository last updated
- Nov 5, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- ai-security Repository topic
- ai-skills Repository topic
- security-skills Repository topic
- dynamic-workflow Repository topic
- testing Derived category
Files and excerpt
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## Contents
- Scope & authorization
- Why raw sockets
- Methodology (timing probes then differential confirmation)
- Payloads (CL.TE and TE.CL, exact bytes)
- Runnable snippet
- Output
## Scope & authorization
Request smuggling is an ACTIVE, potentially disruptive check. A successful desync poisons the shared front-end-to-back-end connection: the smuggled prefix can attach to the *next* request on that socket, which in a real deployment may belong to another user. Run this only against hosts you own or are contractually engaged to test, and prefer a low-traffic window. The timing probes (Steps 2-3) are the safest first pass because they never leave a dangling prefix; the differential confirmations (Steps 4-5) do smuggle a real prefix and should follow only once timing suggests a desync.
The vulnerability exists when a request traverses two servers (CDN/load-balancer/reverse-proxy front-end, then an origin back-end) that disagree on where one request ends and the next begins. That disagreement comes from sending both a `Content-Length` (CL) and a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` (TE) header: if the front-end honors one and the back-end the other, the leftover bytes are "smuggled." A single server with no proxy in front cannot desync, so a negative result on a direct-to-origin host is expected, not a clean bill.
