Individual skill
self-hosted-runner-abuse
Self-hosted runner abuse — non-ephemeral runner persistence, fork-PR job execution on self-hosted, runner-label targeting, secret/token theft from runner env, lateral movement from runner into internal network and cloud metadata services.
packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/self-hosted-runner-abuse/SKILL.md
Source commit cc6044561ff32188dc0aa899bcc7d3666ffcfd1c
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 2, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
Install this skill
Choose an agent in your Stack or copy a command below. Commands fetch the pinned commit and copy only this skill directory. Existing destinations are refused. Copying a command does not install anything.
An install command is unavailable: current rules, complete repository and skill scans, an eligible behavior level and a permitted license are required.
Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 6,560
- Repository last updated
- Nov 7, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent Repository topic
- ai Repository topic
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- hacking Repository topic
- langchain Repository topic
- langgraph Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- generative-ai Repository topic
- pentesting Repository topic
- pentest Repository topic
- ci-cd,-self-hosted-runner,-persistence,-lateral-movement Declared skill tag
- engineering Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Browse files
Read excerpt
# Self-Hosted Runner Abuse
Self-hosted runners are attacker dreams: long-lived machines inside the target's network, with the build user's filesystem, often persistent between jobs, frequently reachable to internal services and cloud metadata. **Default GitHub policy on public repos is to NOT run workflows from first-time contributors without approval — but the gate is per-repo and frequently relaxed.**
## Recon — does the target use self-hosted?
```bash
# 1. Workflow labels
grep -rnE 'runs-on:\s*(\[\s*self-hosted|self-hosted)' <REPO>/.github/workflows/
# 2. Custom labels signal self-hosted runners ("linux-large", "internal", "gpu-a100")
grep -rnE 'runs-on:\s*\[?[a-z0-9_-]+' <REPO>/.github/workflows/ \
| grep -vE 'ubuntu-(latest|20|22|24)|windows-(latest|20)|macos-(latest|13|14)'
