Individual skill
web-subdomain-takeover
Subdomain takeover via dangling DNS/CNAME — GitHub Pages, Heroku, Azure, Fastly, Shopify, Netlify, Surge, Tumblr, Beanstalk, Zendesk, etc.
packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/recon/web-recon/subdomain-takeover/SKILL.md
Source commit df879550544d36b6b1e69062f05adae28537adf2
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 8, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 6,563
- Repository last updated
- Nov 7, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- agent Repository topic
- ai Repository topic
- cybersecurity Repository topic
- hacking Repository topic
- langchain Repository topic
- langgraph Repository topic
- llm Repository topic
- generative-ai Repository topic
- pentesting Repository topic
- pentest Repository topic
- subdomain-takeover,-dangling-dns,-cname,-recon,-bug-bounty Declared skill tag
- engineering Derived category
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# Subdomain Takeover (Dangling DNS / CNAME)
A subdomain CNAMEs to a SaaS provider (GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3, etc.) but the underlying tenant has been deleted, expired, or never claimed. Whoever registers the orphaned tenant name controls a trusted `*.<TARGET>` origin. Severity is almost always **High → Critical** because the attacker inherits the parent domain's cookie scope, CORS allowlist, OAuth `redirect_uri` whitelist, CSP `*.<TARGET>` allowance, and reputation.
## 1. Asset surface — enumerate every subdomain
```bash
# Passive (no traffic to target)
subfinder -d <TARGET> -all -silent -o subs.txt
amass enum -passive -d <TARGET> -o subs.amass.txt
assetfinder --subs-only <TARGET> >> subs.txt
findomain -t <TARGET> -q >> subs.txt
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.<TARGET>&output=json" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | tr '\n' '\n' | sort -u >> subs.txt
sort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt