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smuggling

HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) — front-end / back-end parser disagreement attacks that desync the proxy stack. Covers CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, CL.0, HTTP/2 downgrade (h2.cl, h2.te), pipelining, and connection-state pinning. Includes a confirm-desync gate, header obfuscation catalog, and minimal raw-socket Python harnesses (no smuggler.py available in sandbox).

packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/web/smuggling/SKILL.md

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# HTTP Request Smuggling (Desync)

Exploits parser disagreement between two HTTP intermediaries on the same connection (front-end CDN/proxy ↔ back-end origin). When one side ends a request at byte X and the other at byte Y, the bytes between X and Y are the "smuggled" prefix of the next victim request — letting the attacker rewrite the next user's request, steal cookies/headers, or hit auth-bypassed routes.

## When This Skill Is Primary

HRS bypasses authentication and authorization at the front-end/back-end boundary — it does NOT need correct credentials. **When `smuggling_desync` (or `request_smuggling` / `hrs` / `desync`) co-occurs with credential-related tags (`default_credentials`, `jwt`, `weak_password`), smuggling IS the primary attack vector.** Credential brute-force is a fallback only after the confirm-desync gate (below) fires NEGATIVE.

Reasoning: a CTF that ships both tags is signaling "you have a low-priv account (`test:test`, etc.) — use it as your session anchor and bypass the role check via parser disagreement." Burning the time budget on `admin:*` brute-force misses the design entirely. Use the low-priv credentials as the OUTER request session; smuggle the privileged INNER request.

The same logic applies when `smuggling_desync` co-occurs with `cve` (the CVE is likely the desync primitive; e.g., CVE-2022-24766 is mitmproxy h1 smuggling — see Variant Catalog → CL.0 / pause-based desync below).

## Recognition Signals