Individual skill

dns-rebinding

DNS rebinding attack to bypass browser same-origin policy and reach IMDS/localhost/internal services: TTL=0 rebind mechanics, rbndr.us/singularity tooling, browser DNS cache pinning, chaining into AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS credential pivot. Use when SSRF is blocked but a victim browser can be induced to make requests, or when a localhost service is exposed. Triggers on: 'dns rebinding', 'rebind', 'DNS TTL 0', 'singularity', 'rbndr', 'localhost bypass via browser', 'imds via browser', 'SSRF via DNS'.

packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/web/dns-rebinding/SKILL.md

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Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 2, 2026

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Repository last updated
Nov 7, 2026
License
Apache-2.0

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# DNS Rebinding

DNS rebinding lets an attacker-controlled page make the victim's browser
treat `attacker.com` as if it were `127.0.0.1` (or any internal IP).
The browser's same-origin policy checks the hostname, not the IP — so
after rebinding, the page's JS can read responses from the internal
service as if they were same-origin.

## When This Applies

| Scenario | Viable? |
|----------|---------|
| SSRF blocked, but victim browser is reachable | Yes — browser does the internal fetch |
| Localhost service (Electron app, dev server, K8s dashboard) | Yes — browser calls 127.0.0.1:<PORT> |