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cicd

CI/CD pipeline attack category — poisoned pipeline execution, GitHub Actions expression injection, self-hosted runner abuse, secrets/OIDC exfil. Routing skill: fingerprint the CI provider + workflow surface, then load the matching leaf.

packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/SKILL.md

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# CI/CD Pipeline Exploitation — Category Overview

Routing skill for attacks against build / deployment pipelines. Pipelines run attacker-influenced code (PRs, dependencies, build scripts) with privileged tokens, cloud OIDC, and write access to artifacts that downstream consumers trust. Compromise of a single pipeline often equals compromise of every release built by it.

## Sub-Skills

| Sub-Skill | Covers | When to Load |
|---|---|---|
| **poisoned-pipeline-execution** | Direct + Indirect PPE: injecting commands via attacker-controllable build files (`Makefile`, `package.json` scripts, `build.gradle`, `Dangerfile`, `.pre-commit-config.yaml`), `pull_request_target` abuse, fork-PR build triggers, dependency/test-script execution. | Target builds untrusted PR code; you can land a malicious file or dependency. | `load_skill("/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/poisoned-pipeline-execution/SKILL.md")` |
| **github-actions-injection** | `${{ }}` template injection via untrusted context (issue/PR title, body, branch name, commit message) into `run:` steps, `pull_request_target` + PR-head checkout, `GITHUB_TOKEN` permission abuse, artifact/cache poisoning, action pinning (tag vs SHA). | Target uses GitHub Actions and accepts external contributors. | `load_skill("/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/github-actions-injection/SKILL.md")` |
| **self-hosted-runner-abuse** | Non-ephemeral runner persistence, fork-PR job execution on self-hosted, runner-label targeting, secret theft from runner env, lateral movement into internal network / cloud metadata. | Target advertises self-hosted runners (workflow `runs-on:` label or public job logs). | `load_skill("/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/self-hosted-runner-abuse/SKILL.md")` |
| **cicd-secrets-exfil** | Extracting CI secrets / OIDC tokens: `echo` / `printenv` exfil, masking bypass (base64, char-split), OIDC -> cloud role assumption, `GITHUB_TOKEN` / `CI_JOB_TOKEN` scope abuse, cache / artifact secret leakage. | You already have code execution in a CI job; need to convert it into durable cloud / registry access. | `load_skill("/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/cicd-secrets-exfil/SKILL.md")` |

## Provider fingerprinting