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agentic-app-audit

Black-box security audit of a DEPLOYED AI agent (not the MCP server behind it) — tool-call hijacking, cross-session memory poisoning, confused-deputy via connected tools, agent-to-agent IDOR, excessive agency / unconfirmed destructive actions, and privilege compromise where the agent holds broader perms than the user. Use when the target is a live assistant/agent product with tool access (bookings, email, payments, file/RAG, browsing) rather than a raw LLM chat box or an MCP server you can read.

skills/agentic-app-audit/SKILL.md

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Observed behavior
Network or broad shell
Last checked
Nov 3, 2026

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5,682
Repository last updated
Oct 28, 2026
License
MIT

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# Agentic App Audit

> The agent is a confused deputy with real hands. You are not trying to make it say something — you are trying to make it *do* something, with its privileges, on someone else's behalf. The bug is the action and whose authority it borrowed.

Distinct from its siblings: `skills/llm-redteam` attacks the model's text behavior; `skills/mcp-server-audit` audits the server/tool definitions you can inspect; this skill attacks the **deployed agent as a black box** through its product surface.

## 0. QUICK KILL CHECKLIST

- The "dangerous" tool requires a confirmation step the attacker can't satisfy -> Informational.
- Memory "poisoning" only affects your own session and resets -> not cross-user, kill it.
- Agent calls a tool but with only your own data / your own scope -> no cross-tenant impact, kill it.
- Agent reveals a tool list but every tool is read-only and user-scoped -> disclosure only.

## 1. ROUTING TABLE — signal -> move