Individual skill
llm-redteam
LLM application red-teaming — prompt injection (direct + indirect), jailbreak, system-prompt leak, data exfiltration, guardrail bypass, multi-turn crescendo, cross-lingual + cipher + invisible-unicode token smuggling, excessive agency / tool abuse, insecure output handling. Canonical OWASP LLM Top 10 + ASI01-ASI10 mapping. Use when a target exposes a chat/completions/assistant/copilot endpoint, an AI feature that consumes user text or documents, or any /v1/chat, /api/chat, /mcp surface.
skills/llm-redteam/SKILL.md
Source commit 8060af0c1b0b6ecc6595ee3261f50aa613038620
What was checked
- Matches the observed repository HEAD
- Yes
- Scanner rules are current
- Yes
- Repository scan complete
- No
- Skill scan complete
- No
- Observed behavior
- Network or broad shell
- Last checked
- Nov 3, 2026
These are observations at the recorded commit, not a guarantee of safety. Review the source before running it.
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Repository context
- Repository stars (not skill ratings)
- 5,668
- Repository last updated
- Oct 28, 2026
- License
- MIT
Observed agent integration: No specific integration evidence. Standard SKILL.md installation does not imply verified compatibility.
- ai-security Repository topic
- bug-bounty Repository topic
- bugcrowd Repository topic
- claude-ai Repository topic
- ethical-hacking Repository topic
- hackerone Repository topic
- penetration-testing Repository topic
- recon Repository topic
- vulnerability-scanner Repository topic
- claude-code Repository topic
- data Derived category
- security Derived category
- security-application Derived category
Files and excerpt
File metadata and permitted, redacted excerpts come from the recorded scan. Source links are pinned to that commit.
Read excerpt
# LLM Red-Team
> Reflection is not exploitation. A model that *echoes* your payload is noise; a model that *acts* on it — leaks its system prompt, emits your canary, calls a tool, renders raw HTML downstream — is a bug. Prove the action, then chain it to concrete impact.
This is the first-class LLM-attack skill. The scanner behind it is `bughunter/tools/llm_redteam.py` (canary-based corpus runner, `/llm-redteam`). For auditing an MCP *server*, use `skills/mcp-server-audit`; for attacking a *deployed agent* black-box, use `skills/agentic-app-audit`.
## 0. QUICK KILL CHECKLIST
Kill the lead (classify Informational, move on) when:
- The model refuses and no canary / leak / tool-call ever lands. "It said something edgy" is not a finding.
- System-prompt "leak" is just generic assistant boilerplate ("I am a helpful assistant"), not the target's actual instructions.
- Prompt injection fires but reads/changes nothing the current user couldn't already access (no cross-tenant data, no tool with impact).
- Output looks like XSS but the host app escapes it before rendering (check the actual downstream sink, not the chat response).