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agent-security-hardening

Security hardening guidance for AI agent frameworks that process untrusted content, invoke tools, write workspace files, manage runtime identifiers, or handle credentials. Use when building or reviewing an agent runtime, autonomous worker, tool gateway, memory service, or multi-tenant agent deployment. Do not use for general web application security or offensive testing.

pi/core/skills/agent-security-hardening/SKILL.md

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# Agent Security Hardening

Harden the boundaries where an agent turns untrusted data into filesystem, network, memory, or tool actions. Produce concrete controls and tests for the framework being reviewed; a checklist without enforcement evidence is incomplete.

## Important

- Treat model output, retrieved content, tool output, memory, and cross-agent messages as untrusted input.
- Default external integrations to read-only and grant each write capability separately.
- Validate at the action boundary even when an upstream prompt or schema already validated the value.
- Fail closed before a side effect when identity, destination, ownership, or containment cannot be proven.
- Before a delete, publish, credential rotation, or other irreversible action, the real tool entry point must authorize the authenticated principal for that exact operation and resource scope, then require explicit confirmation or a valid scoped pre-approval. Missing or invalid evidence blocks the action.
- Use hard bounds defined by the governing requirement and stricter values verified from deployment configuration. When neither defines a value, mark it as a required decision and test that the implementation rejects an unbounded configuration; do not invent a plausible value.

## When to Activate